Iron Rhine
06.32 / 07.22 / 08.02
From 2006 to 2007
TML, in collaboration with TNO, conducted transport forecasts and a social cost-benefit analysis of the Iron Rhine to evaluate the economic and environmental impact of a reopening. TML used the European TRANS-TOOLS model to simulate scenarios and provide insight into expected transport volumes and the feasibility of the project.
The Iron Rhine is a railway line connecting the port of Antwerp with Germany's Ruhr region. In 1998, Belgium asked the Netherlands to recommission the Iron Rhine because of the increase in freight transport from the port of Antwerp to the German hinterland. As Belgium and the Netherlands failed to agree on the level of costs, sharing, and risks, among others, it was finally decided in late 2002 to have the dispute settled by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. In May 2005, the Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague made its ruling. Both countries had to jointly appoint a commission of independent experts (COD) to determine the amount of the various cost items before it could be determined exactly what each country should pay.
Following the arbitral award, several preliminary studies were required. Commissioned by Infrabel and ProRail (Belgian and Dutch infrastructure managers), TML worked with TNO on the following studies.
The transport forecasts
The aim of the transport forecasts was to gain insight into the number of trains that could use the Iron Rhine. Here, the European TRANS-TOOLS model was used for four background scenarios related to economic growth and general transport policy. Based on these calculations, it was decided by the Netherlands and Belgium to reactivate the Iron Rhine so that 72 goods trains per day (both directions combined) would be able to pass.
This study ended in 2007. A press release was issued by both governments and the study was submitted to the Lower House.
The social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) on the entire link from Antwerp to the Ruhr area
This SCBA included all possible costs and benefits with special attention to distributional effects between the countries involved and effects on other modes (road traffic, inland navigation). The analysis was done for four project alternatives and for two of the four background scenarios from the transport forecast. The project alternatives differ in terms of route (historical route versus A52) and in the traction provided (diesel versus electric).
To reopen the Iron Rhine, the three countries needed to make an investment of between €590 million and €750 million.
The reopening would lead to negative benefits for society of €335 to 530 million (investment costs included). These negative benefits consider shifts from road and inland waterways to rail and all external costs (mostly environmental) of all modes.
The main reason why the project scored so poorly is that the Iron Rhine mainly attracts traffic from the existing Montzen route, which is not yet at its capacity limits. The benefit to users for switching routes is small and there is also only a limited impact on road congestion. These small benefits never compensate for the high investment costs. Even if transport growth between Antwerp and Germany were to increase more than predicted by the models, the benefits are too small to cover the high investment costs. Moreover, the shift from electric trains on the Montzen route to diesel trains on the Iron Rhine causes additional emission costs.
The Iron Rhine is a railway line connecting the port of Antwerp with Germany's Ruhr region. In 1998, Belgium asked the Netherlands to recommission the Iron Rhine because of the increase in freight transport from the port of Antwerp to the German hinterland. As Belgium and the Netherlands failed to agree on the level of costs, sharing, and risks, among others, it was finally decided in late 2002 to have the dispute settled by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague. In May 2005, the Arbitral Tribunal of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague made its ruling. Both countries had to jointly appoint a commission of independent experts (COD) to determine the amount of the various cost items before it could be determined exactly what each country should pay.
Following the arbitral award, several preliminary studies were required. Commissioned by Infrabel and ProRail (Belgian and Dutch infrastructure managers), TML worked with TNO on the following studies.
The transport forecasts
The aim of the transport forecasts was to gain insight into the number of trains that could use the Iron Rhine. Here, the European TRANS-TOOLS model was used for four background scenarios related to economic growth and general transport policy. Based on these calculations, it was decided by the Netherlands and Belgium to reactivate the Iron Rhine so that 72 goods trains per day (both directions combined) would be able to pass.
This study ended in 2007. A press release was issued by both governments and the study was submitted to the Lower House.
The social cost-benefit analysis (SCBA) on the entire link from Antwerp to the Ruhr area
This SCBA included all possible costs and benefits with special attention to distributional effects between the countries involved and effects on other modes (road traffic, inland navigation). The analysis was done for four project alternatives and for two of the four background scenarios from the transport forecast. The project alternatives differ in terms of route (historical route versus A52) and in the traction provided (diesel versus electric).
To reopen the Iron Rhine, the three countries needed to make an investment of between €590 million and €750 million.
The reopening would lead to negative benefits for society of €335 to 530 million (investment costs included). These negative benefits consider shifts from road and inland waterways to rail and all external costs (mostly environmental) of all modes.
The main reason why the project scored so poorly is that the Iron Rhine mainly attracts traffic from the existing Montzen route, which is not yet at its capacity limits. The benefit to users for switching routes is small and there is also only a limited impact on road congestion. These small benefits never compensate for the high investment costs. Even if transport growth between Antwerp and Germany were to increase more than predicted by the models, the benefits are too small to cover the high investment costs. Moreover, the shift from electric trains on the Montzen route to diesel trains on the Iron Rhine causes additional emission costs.
